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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BILLIE PETERSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CASE NO. 960271 
950700314 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-2-2(3)(j). The matter has been 
poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Statement of Issues and Standard of Review 
1. Whether Mr. Peterson is entitled to receive no-fault wage 
benefits in addition to the temporary total disability payments he 
received as worker's compensation payments. 
2. The standard for review is in the interpretation of a 
statute, a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State of 
Utah v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993); Shurtz v. BMW of 
North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
Determinative Statutes 
Section 31A-22-309 (3) (a) , Utah Code Annotated and Neel v. 
State of Utah, 889 P.2d 922. 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
Billie Peterson was injured in a truck rollover on September 
6, 1993. The rollover was the fault of a co-employee. Mr. 
Peterson claimed no-fault wage benefits from Allstate, which 
insured the truck in which he was riding, because his regular 
weekly wage far exceeded the weekly wage loss benefits paid to him 
by his employer's worker's compensation carrier. 
Before his injury, Mr. Peterson's weekly income was 
approximately $1,721. Following his injury, he was paid worker's 
compensation wage benefits of $377 per week, thus producing a 
weekly income reduction of approximately $1,344. (R.48; 33). 
Course of the Proceedings 
Mr. Peterson filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment 
that he was entitled to receive the maximum of $250 in no-fault 
benefits to partially make up or reduce his weekly wage shortfall 
between his pre-injury and post-injury wage loss. His complaint 
was dismissed. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On September 6, 1993, Billie Peterson was employed by R&O 
Construction Company of Ogden, Utah. 
2. Mr. Peterson and a co-employee were assigned to a job site 
in Nevada. 
3. The co-employee was driving his private truck to the job 
site in Nevada. Mr. Peterson was a passenger in the truck. 
4. Both Mr. Peterson and the co-employee driver were being 
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paid some reduced wage compensation for their travel time. 
5* While driving west on 1-80 in Tooele County, the co-
employee apparently fell asleep at the wheel. The truck left the 
roadway and rolled. The driver was killed and Mr. Peterson was 
severely injured. 
6. At the time of his injury, Mr. Peterson was earning 
approximately $1,721 per week. 
7. Following his injury, Mr. Peterson received worker's 
compensation benefits in the form of temporary total disability 
payments in the amount of $377 per week. 
8. Mr. Peterson's co-employee and driver of the truck in 
question was insured by Allstate Insurance Company for no-fault 
insurance purposes. 
9. Mr. Peterson contends that he is entitled to be paid the 
statutory maximum of $250 per week by Allstate under the no-fault 
statute over and above the $377 per week he was receiving in 
worker's compensation benefits, because his weekly wage, in this 
instance, far exceeded the combination of those two sums, and 
pursuant to the Utah No-Fault Statute, he was entitled to have 
those sums combined. 
10. Following briefing and argument, the trial court granted 
the insurance company's Motion for Summary Judgment, ruling that 
Mr. Peterson was not entitled to receive no-fault wage benefits in 
addition to the worker's compensation benefits he did receive, 
because the weekly worker's compensation benefits of $377 exceeded 
the weekly amount set forth in the no-fault statute. 
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Summary of the Argument 
Mr. Peterson is entitled to receive $250 per week in no-fault 
wage benefits for a period of 52 weeks because his pre-injury 
weekly wage and thus his post-injury weekly income loss far 
exceeded the maximum statutory amounts payable to him under either 
the worker's compensation statute or the no-fault statute, or both 
in combination. 
Argument 
Under the Utah Code, a no-fault insurer is permitted to 
exclude or limit from coverage under its policy any liability for 
injuries which are compensable under the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Statute. The statute states that n[t]he benefits payable to any 
injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are reduced by . . . any 
benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a 
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' 
compensation or similar statutory plan.11 U.C.A. Section 31A-22-
309(3)(a). 
The statute's exclusionary provision has been interpreted by 
the Utah Court of Appeals in Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790 
P. 2d 573, 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah 1995). These courts agree 
that "the no-fault insurer is permitted by this statute to exclude 
from coverage provided under its insurance policy any liability for 
injuries that are compensable under the workers' compensation 
statute. . . . " Bevans 790 P. 2d at 577. However, the Utah Supreme 
Court made it clear in Neel that the statute does not mean that a 
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no-fault insurer may exclude all of its liability merely because 
this injured party is entitled to workers7 compensation benefits. 
Neel, 889 P.d at 925- The Neel court stated that "where an 
accident is covered by both workers' compensation and no-fault 
insurance, the statute permits. . . [exclusion of] some liability— 
that which is compensable under workers' compensation. . . . " Id. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court notes that where state 
statutes provide "that PIP benefits will be reduced by workers' 
compensation benefits as does Section 31A-22-309(3) (a) . . . [those] 
states have uniformly allowed both types of benefits" to be 
recovered. Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah 1995). The 
court cites two main goals for allowing no-fault insurers to limit 
liability when workers' compensation is available. The first goal 
is to insure that the injured party does not receive duplicative 
benefits. Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 925 (citing Tate v. 
Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 815 P.2d 15, 19 (Colo. 1991)). 
The second goal is to coordinate benefits received Neel v. State, 
889 P.2d 922, 925 (citing Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co. 
of Michigan, 437 N.W.2d 338, 339 (Mich. App. 1989). However, in 
this instance, Mr. Peterson does not seek duplicative benefits. 
Instead, he seeks to reduce the magnitude of his weekly wage loss 
by receiving no-fault benefits for his uncompensated wage loss. 
Additionally, the Neel court states that "[h]ad the 
legislature intended PIP insurers to have an absolute defense 
against injured employees, lawmakers could have easily added 
language to the statute indicating this intent," but they did not 
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do so. Neel v. State. 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1995). Instead, the 
no-fault insurance statute provides personal injury protection in 
the form of recompense for medical expenses, household services, 
loss of earnings, funeral expenses and compensation on account of 
death be provided in such a policy. And, these benefits are not 
excludable just because one is entitled to workers' compensation. 
Neel v. State. 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1995). 
With the goals of non-duplicative benefits and coordination of 
insurance benefits in mind, the Neel court states that n[n]o-fault 
insurers. . . are required to pay PIP benefits to injured employees 
to the extent those benefits exceed workers' compensation 
benefits." Neel. 889 P.2d 922 at 926. 
The Utah courts do not specify a method of benefit 
calculation. Nevertheless, other courts have offered methods of 
calculation as between workers' compensation and no-fault PIP 
benefits which are consistent with the Utah statute and the holding 
in Neel. See generally, Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995). 
For example, in Comeau v. Safeco Ins. Co. America, 356 So.2d 790, 
791 (Fla. 1978), a Florida case, a plaintiff was injured while 
driving a tractor-trailer. He received workers' compensation 
benefits, however, those benefits did not totally compensate for 
his loss. The plaintiff sought to recover PIP benefits. The 
insurer paid him some PIP benefits. However, the insurer 
discontinued payment when the workers' compensation benefit, plus 
the paid PIP benefits exceeded the statutorily required policy 
limit. Comeau v. Safeco Insurance Co. America, 356 So.2d 790, 792 
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(Fla. 1978) . 
The insurer argued that their liability was reduced below the 
statutorily required limit because the plaintiff received workers' 
compensation. The lower court granted the insurer summary 
judgment. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the trial 
court's interpretation of an insurer's allowable limitation of 
liability. Instead, the court held that "an insurer is required to 
supplement worker's compensation benefits until the insurer has 
itself paid the limits of liability under its policy for required 
personal injury protection benefits,11 Comeau v. Safeco Ins. Co. 
America, 356 So.2d 790, 794 (Fla. 1978). 
The Comeau court maintained that because PIP protection is 
intended to be a primary source of recompense for anyone injured in 
an automobile accident, PIP benefits should be paid in full whether 
or not other coverage exists, id at 791. The court further stated 
that the purpose of allowing a workers' compensation benefit 
exclusion for the no-fault insurer to prevent "attempt[s] to 
recover for loss not sustained [or] to recover twice for the same 
loss" but it is "not intended to reduce the limits of liability 
under the statutory minimum required for personal injury protection 
benefits." Comeau v. Safeco Ins. Co. America, 356 So.2d 790, 794 
(Fla. 1978). Therefore, because the plaintiff was not trying to 
receive duplicative benefits, but merely seeking due compensation, 
he was entitled to both PIP and workers' compensation benefits. 
Another case delineating the method of calculation where PIP 
and workers' compensation benefits are applicable is Kovarnik v. 
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Royal Globe Ins. Co., 363 So.2d 166, 168 (Fla. App. 1978). In 
Kovarnik, the plaintiff, a truck driver, was injured "when the 
company car he was driving was struck by another vehicle." 
Kovarnik v. Royal Globe Ins. Co. , 363 So.2d at 168. The 
plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits were insufficient to 
cover his loss, therefore, he made a claim against his own no-fault 
insurer for PIP benefits. Id. The no-fault claim was denied. The 
insurer denied the claim because the plaintiff received workers' 
compensation benefits. Kovarnik v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 
166,168 (Fla. App. 1978). The lower court granted defendant's 
summary judgment. The case was reversed. 
The appellate court noted that the no-fault insurer was not 
justified in denying PIP benefits merely because the plaintiff had 
received some workers' compensation benefits. Kovarnik v. Royal 
Globe Ins. Co. , 363 So.2d 166, 168 (Fla. App. 1978). The court 
stated that "[ajlthough a claimant cannot receive both workers' 
compensation benefits and PIP benefits in such a manner as to be 
over compensated for the same injury; still workers' compensation 
benefits received by a claimant do not decrease the total amount of 
PIP coverage available under the policy." Kovarnik v. Royal Globe 
Ins. Co., 363 So.2d at 168. 
The Kovarnik court, indicating the correct method of benefit 
calculation between workers' compensation and PIP benefits, stated 
that: 
If workmens' compensation benefits are 
available, PIP benefits are still primary; 
however to the extent that payments of 
workmens' compensation are made, PIP benefits 
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are supplemental until either the injured 
party has been fully compensated or until the 
PIP carrier has paid its policy limits. 
Kovarnik v. Royal Globe Ins. Co. , 363 So.2d 166, 168 (Fla. App. 
1978). 
A Utah Court of Appeals case, Bevans, addressed the issue of 
what payments are required by workers' compensation carriers when 
PIP benefits are received. Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790 
P.2d 573 (Utah App. 1978). The Industrial Commission allowed the 
workers' compensation carrier to exclude from benefits available 
those benefits paid by the PIP insurer. The appellate court held 
that the Industrial Commission did not have authority to allow the 
workers' compensation insurer such a deduction. id. at 577. 
The workers' compensation carrier cited U.C.A. Section 31A-22-
309(3) (a) as allowing an analogous exclusion for workers' 
compensation payments where PIP benefits were received by the 
injured party. The court stated that this statute was irrelevant 
to the facts and that workers' compensation benefits could not be 
reduced in such a manner. Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790 
P.2d 573, 577 (Utah App. 1978). In dicta, the Bevans court 
interpreted U.C.A. Section 31A-22-309(3)(a) as permitting the no-
fault insurer to "exclude from coverage provided under its 
insurance policy any liability for injuries that are compensable 
under the workers' compensation statute," and no more. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of PIP and workers' 
compensation benefits for the same injury in Neel v. State, 889 
P.2d 922 (Utah 1995). In Neel v. State the plaintiff was injured 
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"while riding in a state-owned car in the course of her 
employment." Neel v. State, 889 P. 2d 922 at 925. Her employer 
paid all of her workers' compensation benefits, but refused to pay 
PIP benefits. The plaintiff sought to recover the PIP benefits for 
"loss of household services, second-job wage loss, and the 
difference between wage reimbursement under workers' compensation 
(seventy percent of lost wages) and under PIP (eighty-five percent 
of lost wages)." Jd. The employer, the State of Utah, refused to 
pay the PIP benefits because the state's self-insurance policy 
specifically excluded coverage of any injury for which one was 
entitled to workers' compensation. Xd. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that such an exclusion was invalid because it was "not in 
harmony with statutory requirements." Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 
at 926. The court interpreted the no-fault statute as requiring 
PIP payments even where one received workers' compensation 
benefits. Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1995). The Neel 
court allowed that PIP benefits are only payable to the extent that 
the damages aren't covered by the workers' compensation benefits. 
In Neel the court specifically states that the no-fault insurer 
must pay PIP benefits that are "not already paid by workers' 
compensation." Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 at 925. Here, no one 
has paid Mr. Peterson any money for his $1,344 weekly wage 
shortfall. 
Billie Peterson should, therefore, receive workers' 
compensation and PIP benefits for his injuries until he is fully 
compensated or until the PIP insurer pays up to the policy limit. 
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Although the Utah courts do not specify the method of 
calculation between no-fault PIP and workers' compensation 
benefits, they do make clear the receiving of workers' compensation 
does not exclude the injured party from receiving additional PIP 
benefits. In Utah, if one's workers' compensation benefits do not 
cover benefits provided by PIP, then one is entitled to receive 
those PIP benefits beyond workers' compensation coverage. Of 
course, no plaintiff may recover duplicative benefits, but to the 
extent that worker's compensation doesn't cover one's damages, the 
PIP benefits must be paid. Here, Mr. Peterson's weekly wage far 
exceeds available benefits under workers' compensation or PIP. 
Likewise, the difference between his weekly wage and workers' 
compensation payments received far exceeds the available maximum 
amount under PIP. Thus, there is no overlap or duplication of wage 
benefits received. 
Billie Peterson, like the plaintiff in Neel whose workers' 
compensation benefits for lost wages did not cover her loss, should 
be paid PIP benefits to make up that difference. Further, any 
benefits that are not covered under workers' compensation, but are 
covered under the no-fault scheme must be paid. (e.g. household 
service benefits). 
The Utah court's interpretation of U.C.A. Section 31A-22-
309(3) (a) indicates that although a no-fault insurer doesn't have 
to pay for the same benefits one receives under workers' 
compensation, they still have to adhere to their policy 
commitments. The adoption of goals of non-duplicative benefits and 
11 
coordination of benefits by the court in Neel shows the court's 
understanding of the importance of the different purposes of 
recompense under the workers' compensation and no-fault statutes. 
Workers' compensation is designed to compensate one injured on 
the job. PIP benefits required in a no-fault insurance policy are 
designed to compensate anyone injured in an automobile accident. 
The court's reluctance to allow insurance providers an absolute 
defense when workers' compensation benefits come into play 
indicates a desire to coordinate benefits, not deny them. The 
approach suggested by Mr. Peterson merely coordinates the benefits 
granted by the respective coverages in circumstances where, as 
here, the weekly wage far exceeds the total benefits payable under 
the two types of coverage. 
Any injury sustained by Billie Peterson that is not covered by 
workers' compensation, but is covered under the no-fault, PIP must 
be paid. The Neel and Bevans decisions interpret U.C.A. Section 
31A-22-309(3)(a) as requiring the insurer to pay benefits to the 
extent that the injuries are not covered under workers' 
compensation. 
The argument asserted by Allstate (that because the weekly 
worker's compensation benefits exceeded statutory no-fault 
benefits, thus completely eliminating any obligation to pay no-
fault wage compensation) is inconsistent with the court's 
interpretation of the allowable liability exclusion under U.C.A. 
Section 31A-22-309(3)(a) in the Neel and Bevans decisions. 
Although the Utah courts allow no-fault insurers to exclude some 
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liability when one is entitled to workers' compensation, the courts 
clearly do not allow a total dismissal of liability. The only 
benefits that the no-fault insurer is allowed to exclude are those 
specifically paid by workers' compensation. Workers' compensation 
and PIP benefits are not identical. PIP benefits are available 
above and beyond workers' compensation benefits and the no-fault 
insurer must pay them in circumstances where the earnings level of 
the injured employee permits. 
Allstate appears to be asserting the same argument the 
defendant-insurers did in Kovarnik. That is, that their liability 
is off-set by workers' compensation up to the statutorily required 
policy limit for no-fault PIP benefits. The Utah court's have 
never said this is the correct method of calculation between no-
fault and workers' compensation. Utah, in essence, agrees with the 
holding in Kovarnik that, PIP benefits supplement workers' 
compensation. However, Utah's language says that no-fault insurers 
pay to the extent that workers' compensation doesn't. This 
language is consistent with the concept of PIP as supplemental to 
workers' compensation. The court's holding in Neel is not 
consistent with the notion that insurers may reduce their liability 
below the statutorily required minimum for PIP benefits because of 
workers' compensation. 
Allstate misinterprets the Utah Supreme Court's holding in 
Neel. Allstate's argument further ignores the goals cited for 
allowing any exclusion of PIP benefits. The goals are only to 
insure that one doesn't receive duplicative benefits and to 
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coordinate benefits. The idea of coordinating benefits presupposes 
that there will be more than one source of benefits to coordinate. 
Conclusion 
Billie Peterson should be paid PIP benefits to the extent that 
they are not duplicative of workers' compensation benefits. The 
argument asserted by Allstate, that they may reduce their liability 
below the statutorily required limit of PIP benefits is 
inconsistent with the court's interpretation of the statutory 
exclusion provision and the Utah case law. 
DATED this , 1996 day of 
MARQUARDT, HASJSNYAGER & CUSTEN 
R. HASENYAGER 
'Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this \/L day of jf\ Uq . 1996, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Brief of 
Appellant, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
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ADDENA 
ADDENDUM A 
Robert G. Gilchrist (A3715) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND IUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION AND 
FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 950700314 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
Plaintiff, Billie Peterson, by and through his counsel of record James R -
Hasenyager, and defendant Allstate by and through its counsel of record Robert G Gilchrist, 
hereby stipulate and agree that the Allstate Insurance Company has not denied coverage for 
household services under the No-Fault P I P section of the statute providing coverage to Billie 
Peterson. The parties hereby agree that the issue of coverage for household services is not a part 
of this litigation and that the court has resolved all issues and can issue a final Order of 
Dismissal. 
DATED this day of. 1996. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER 
&CUSTEN 
DATED this day of / 
James R. Hasenyager 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
. 1996. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
The court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and having reviewed the parties' Stipulation that 
insurance coverage for lost household services is not pending before the court and the court 
having concluded that all other issues of fact and law in this matter have been resolved, that it is 
hereby Ordered that Judgment may be entered pursuant to the terms of the court's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and that this matter be dismissed with prejudice and on the merits, 
with each party to bear its own costs 
DATED this fin day of fyVfl/vA 1996 
&Y THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
7Z James R. Hasenyager 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
% 
The Honorable Glen R Dawson 
Robert G Gilchrist 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM B 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN LC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3 662 
Utah State Bar No. 1404 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE PETERSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 950700314 
Judge: Glen Dawson 
Notice is hereby given that plaintiff/appellant, Billie 
Peterson, through counsel James R. Hasenyager of the firm 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court 
the Order Granting Defendant Allstate Insurance Company's Motion 
for Summary Judgment signed by the Honorable Glen Dawson on 
DATED this J day ofCy^^-^ 1996. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
fe. 
y 
JAMES R. 
Attorney for Pla 
Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. 
Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
********************** 
^Ul^L 
I hereby certify that on this *•—) day of itey, 199 6, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Notice 
of Appeal, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
50 South Main #700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN LC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3662 
Utah State Bar No. 1404 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE PETERSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appe1lee. 
CERTIFICATE THAT TRANSCRIPT IS 
NOT REQUIRED 
Civil No. 950700314 
Judge: Glen Dawson 
Appellant, through counsel James R. Hasenyager of the 
firm of MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN, certifies that no 
transcript will be requested in the above-entitled case. 
DATED this 5 day olCjfc-<sJ? , 1996. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
********************** \ 
r OUR. 
I hereby certify that on this £^ 7 day of -May, 1996, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Certificate That Transcript is Not Required, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
50 South Main #700 
P.0- Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SECRETARY 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE PETERSON. 
(Plaintiff/Appellant) 
VS. 
BOND NO. 1151708 
UNDERTAKING 
FOR COST 
Case No. 950700314 
Judge: Glen Dawson 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 
(Defendant/Appellee) 
WHEREAS, the above-named plaintiff desires to give an undertaking for COST as provided by 
Section 63-30-19 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
NOW, THEREFORE, Old Republic Surety Company, a corporation duly licensed to do business in 
the State of Utah, as Surety, does hereby obligate itself, its successors and assigns to the above named 
defendants under said statutory obligations in the sum of THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS and NO/100 ($300.00**) 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah the 1st day of August , 1996 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY 
BY:/ &TX/Sjfa y 
Its: Kbthleen Fowler, Attorney-iiTFact 
AFFIDAVIT OF QUALIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
Kathleen Fowler appeared personally before me and declared that she is the Attorney-in-Fact of the Old 
Republic Surety Company, and that she is duly authorized to execute and deliver the foregoing obligation; 
that said Company is authorized to execute the same and has complied in all respects with that laws of 
Utah, in reference to becoming sole surety upon bonds, undertakings and obligations. 
fyrtJ/4* JsJyw^i/ 
T
 Kathleen Fowler/Tmorney-in-Fact 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 1st Day of August, 1996. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
BARBARA j . NORTH 
405 South Main #800 
S.L.C, UT 84111 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
MAY 21, 1999 
STATE OF UTAH 
My commission expires 6 ? / / ^ 9 
/? 
77" 
U 
Notary Public 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
f^fowEf^ oarqaaRN^ 
W H ^ ^ i C M ^ f f i 
Mtslgip^d lawful ftfrri§y|^n^cl vHtlFfijj ( ^^a^^u thorS^W (fe(S>rvi#aLQ^ and affix t^fie sealbf the 
^t^n£tbept6^i f ja s ^ l l ^ g c H r ^ fen^^i^edpin^^ec^mz^lcp or othe#AM6Tt^Sgpcgs w the na f f l ^ ^^yp the r lh in Sail jbonds^ank depository 
Jb6ft^jprtg|ge # i c i e i * ^ note g p r a h t y ^ ^ < £ ^ 
y5Ctff§^|^ffianfe^ 
7 7 i 0 3 f e £ ^ pursuantlo these presents, are 
Zbf feosirfttle -iiricfef irrciVby tg^SuthofNyif t f t i fc^wingh fMolutiohs^Mopted by^the boar^jof\direGtprs QUhe OLD REPUBLIC SURETY 
^WM^^&m-JyMuary08ffi^2,^^-.C^^3.i i f " r . i^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S • ' •" . . - -^S| |M.^% i # -rf— -^..-:Vi£<-y v ^ v 
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4 7- if" SgS^ary^mSy: g ^ appointments 
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S r p | i | | e i ^ any\suc&MoJLh^y^n-fact or ^gent and revoke 
^ - j ^ S E g ^ E D FU|p? l i l ^ th^ obligation shaU"b'e va^aneTbindin^ ft . ft~ 
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-l?^7:l^^QLSEfib Ffyf|^EI^0>at7iffS sfgrrature of any authorized officeriarid Jhe7 .^a t^ te^n^ i i y tflaybe affixed by facsimile to-any Power^ ofTAttorney or 
7 ; . ^ ^ and delivery of any-bohdftindehatajj; rec^nizance, or other suretyship obligations of thecfe(^|^;:ahd stffih 
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 z: ._.:"--" ft ft 7 "v;ft7^ftirAftft^:" ~ 
ftftftMi§|P^ 
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* ^ 7 ^ 
President 
^ ^ f t ^ T t t riRynf MAYL ftjljjft r 9 6 . personally came before Tme, JAMES7^ LEE1 
l in^f B A T O ^ f e M f f l ^ of-the' m : n REPUBLIC SURETYt;OMP/ANY vvho executed the 
:^o\^ th^t rument /and t h e ^ of the same, and being by me duly sworn^did severally^dispose and say; 
7that theyare the;sSd7office%o thatihe seal affixed to the above ihstrumentls the seal of the corporation, 
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%^^^^c^ 
:
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: Notary Public^ - ;^^  
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ft" f, the undersigned^assJStant secretaiy of the OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY, a Wlsconstn corporation; CERTIFY that the 
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ADDENDUM C 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN LC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3662 
Utah State Bar No. 1404 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE PETERSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
CASE NO. ^IpO^l 
1. Date of Entry of Judgment or Order Appealed From: May 23, 
1996. 
2. Nature of Post-Judgment Motions and Date Filed: None. 
3. Date and Effect of Orders Disposing of Post-Judgment 
Motions: Not applicable. 
4. Date of Filing of Notice of Appeal: June 5, 1996. 
5. Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated. 
6. Name of Trial Court: This is an appeal from the Second 
Judicial District Court of Davis County, the Honorable Glen Dawson, 
District Court Judge. 
7. Statements of Facts: 
A. On September 6, 1993, Billie Peterson was employed by 
R & 0 Construction Company of Ogden, Utah. 
Peterson v. Allstate 
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B. Mr* Peterson and a co-employee were assigned to a job 
site in Nevada. 
C. The co-employee was driving his private truck to the 
job site in Nevada. Mr. Peterson was a passenger in the truck. 
D. Both Mr. Peterson and the co-employee driver were 
being paid some wage compensation for their travel time. 
E. While driving west on 1-80 in Tooele County, the co-
employee apparently fell asleep at the wheel. The truck left the 
roadway and rolled. The driver was killed and Mr. Peterson was 
severely injured. 
F. At the time of his injury, Mr. Peterson was earning 
approximately $721 per week. 
G. Following his injury, Mr. Peterson received worker's 
compensation benefits and temporary total disability payments in 
the amount of $377 per week. 
H. Mr. Peterson's co-employee and driver of the truck in 
question was insured by Allstate Insurance Company for no-fault 
insurance purposes. 
I. Mr. Peterson has contended that he is entitled to be 
paid the maximum of $250 per week under the no-fault coverage 
through Allstate Insurance Company, which payments should be made 
over and above the $377 per week he was receiving in worker's 
compensation benefits, because his weekly wage far exceeded the 
combination of those two sums and pursuant to the Utah No-Fault 
Statute, he was entitled to have those sums combined. 
Peterson v. Allstate 
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J. Following briefing and argument, the trial court 
granted the insurance company's motion for summary judgment ruling 
that Mr. Peterson was not entitled to receive no-fault wage 
benefits in addition to worker's compensation benefits he did 
receive. 
8. Issues for Review and Standard of Review: 
A. Whether Mr. Peterson is entitled to receive no-fault 
wage benefits in addition to the temporary total disability 
payments he received as workers compensation payments; 
B. The standard for review is in the interpretation of 
a statute, a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993); Shurtz v. BMW of North 
America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
9. Determinative Statutes and Case Law: Section 31A-22-
309(3) (a), Utah Code Annotated and Neel v. State of Utah, 889 P.2d 
922. 
DATED this ^ day of KltAlAJ^, 1996. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
ki 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * \ 
I hereby certify that on this S day of MSy, 1996, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Docketing Statement, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
50 South Main #7 00 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Sue NEEL, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
V. 
STATE of Utah, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 940282. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb 2, 1995. 
State employee who was injured in car 
accident while riding in state-owned car in 
course of her employment brought action to 
recover personal injury protection (PIP) ben-
efits against the state, as self-insurer. The 
Second Distinct Court, Weber County, dis-
missed action, and employee appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Bench, J., 854 P.2d 581, 
reversed and remanded. The Second Dis-
trict Court, Stanton M. Taylor, JM entered 
summary judgment for state, and employee 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., 
held that workers' compensation exclusivity 
provision did not bar action, overruling IML 
Freight Inc v Otiosen 
Reversed and remanded 
1. Appeal and Error <^842(2) 
Because parties raised only questions of 
lau, Supreme Court would give trial court's 
legal conclusions no deference and would re-
view them for conectness 
2. Insurance e=467.61(4) 
Whether employee is entitled to person-
al injury protection (PIP) benefits cannot 
turn on employer's decision to secure private 
insurance or to self-insure U C.A. 1953, 41-
12a-407(2) 
3. Insurance <S=532.5(3) 
Where automobile accident is covered by 
both workers' compensation and no-fault in-
surance, statute providing that personal inju-
ry protection (PIP) benefits are payable to 
injured employee but are reduced by benefits 
which he receives under workers' compensa-
tion permits no-fault insurer to exclude some 
liability, that which is compensable under 
workers' compensation, but not all liability; 
oveiruling IML Freight, Inc. v Ottosen, 538 
P.2d 296. U.C.A.1953, 31A-22-309(3)(a). 
4. Statutes <s=>174 
Supreme Court has no power to rewrite 
statute to make it conform to an intention not 
expressed. 
5. Workers' Compensation <£=2084 
Workers' compensation exclusivity provi-
sion did not bar action for personal injury 
protection (PIP) benefits under Automobile 
No-Fault Insurance Act brought against 
State, as self-insurer, by state employee who 
was injured in car accident while riding in 
state-owned car in course of her employment. 
6. Insurance <S=>532.5(3) 
No-fault insurers, including self-insur-
ers, are required to pay personal injury pro-
tection (PIP) benefits to injured employees 
to extent that those benefits exceed workers' 
compensation benefits. 
7. Insurance <s=>138(4) 
Although state's self-insurance program 
excludes personal injury protection (PIP) 
benefits to any person entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits, this exclusion is not in 
harmony with statutory requirements and is, 
therefore, invalid. U.C.A.1953, 31A-22-
309(3)(a). 
Daniel L. Wilson, Ogden, for plaintiff. 
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Brent A. Burnett, 
Asst. Atty Gen., Salt Lake City, for defen-
dant. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Plaintiff Sue Neel brought this action 
against her employer, the State of Utah, to 
collect personal injury protection ("PIP") 
benefits under Utah's Automobile No-Fault 
Insurance Act The State initially moved to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to comply 
with the requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. The trial court granted the 
motion without prejudice. On appeal, the 
Utah Court of Appeals held that because the 
action sounded in contract, the procedural 
requirements of the immunity act did not 
NEEL v 
Cite as 889 P.2d 
apply Neel v State, 854 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 
CtApp 1993) 
On remand, the State filed a motion for 
summary judgment, contending that Neel 
was barred from seeking PIP benefits from 
the State by the exclusive remedy provision 
of the Workers' Compensation Act The dis 
tnct court granted the motion on that basis, 
and Neel appeals 
I FACTS 
Neel was injured in a car accident in De-
cember 1990 while nding in a state-owned 
car in the course of her employment with the 
State The State paid her all the workers' 
compensation benefits to which she was enti-
tled In this action, she seeks PIP benefits 
to the extent those benefits were not covered 
by workers' compensation, including reim-
bursement for loss of household services, sec-
ond-job wage loss, and the difference be-
tween wage reimbursement under workers' 
compensation (seventy percent of lost wages) 
and under PIP (eighty-five percent of lost 
wages) See Utah Code Ann § 31A-22-307 
She contends that she is entitled to these 
benefits under section 31A-22-309(3) of the 
code, which provides, "The benefits payable 
to any injured person under [the PIP stat-
ute] are reduced by (a) any benefits which 
that person receives or is entitled to receive 
as a result of an accident covered in this code 
under workers compensation 
At the time of the accident and all other 
dates relevant to this action, the State self-
insured its motor vehicles as permitted by 
statute See § 41-12a-301(4) The State's 
self-insurance program expressly excluded 
from coverage "bodily injury to any person 
who is entitled to payments or benefits under 
the provisions of Utah's Workers' Compensa 
tion Law " 
II ANALYSIS 
[1] The facts are not in dispute Because 
the parties raise only questions of law, this 
court gives the tnal court s legal conclusions 
no deference and reviews them for correct 
ness West Valley City Corp v Salt Lake 
County 852 P 2d 1000, 1002 (Utah 1993) 
. STATE Utah 923 
922 (Utah 1995) 
This case confronts an apparent conflict 
between Utah's no-fault and workers' com-
pensation statutes The No-Fault Act re-
quires that il[e]very policy of insurance or 
combination of policies, purchased to satisfy 
the owner's or operator's security require-
ment of Section 41-12a-301 shall also 
include personal injury protection 
k 31A-22-302(2) (emphasis added) Section 
41-12a-301(3)(a) declares that "the state 
shall maintain owner's or operator's security 
in effect continuously foi then motor vehi-
cles " Thus the State, along with all other 
employers, is required to have PIP coverage 
on its motor vehicles 
Meanwhile, the Workers' Compensation 
Act provides 
The right to recover compensation pursu 
ant to the provisions of this title for inju-
ries sustained by an employee shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer 
and the liabilities of the employer im-
posed by this act shall be in place of any 
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at 
common law or otherwise, to the employ-
ee 
§ 35-1-60 (emphasis added) Hence, while 
one statute requires ever}' auto insurance 
policy—including those held by employers— 
to include PIP coverage, the other statute 
arguably bars injured employees from recov-
ering any benefits from that coverage 
A IML Freight 
This is not an issue of first impression for 
this court Nearly two decades ago, we de-
cided a declaratory judgment action based on 
this same conflict IML FreighL Inc v 
Ottosen, 538 P 2d 296 (Utah 1975) Neel 
argues that IML Freight merely addressed 
the instant issue in dicta However a review 
of the briefs filed by the parties in that case 
and a careful reading of the opinion itself 
have led us to conclude otherwise 
IML Freight arose when employees of an 
interstate trucking companv filed claims 
against the company, requesting no fault 
benefits The company filed an action to 
determine its responsibilities to complv with 
the no-fault statute and, moie specifically 
whether the workers' compensation exclusivi 
ty clause barred injuied employees fiom ob 
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taining benefits from their employers' no-
fault coverage. 
The court framed the issue in terms of 
whether the exclusivity provision "was re-
pealed by the No-Fault concept " Id at 297 
The court discussed the historical importance 
of the exclusive remedy of workers' compen-
sation and reasoned that discrimination 
would result if an employee injured in a 
motor vehicle could recover more benefits 
than an employee injured in another manner. 
Id With little other discussion, the court 
held as follows: 
We believe and hold that the language 
used by the legislature [in the no-fault 
statute) did not impose upon an employer 
subject to the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, the heart-beat of which is exclusive-
ness of remedy, any additional burden per-
sonally to pay any injured employee extra, 
who happened to drive a motor vehicle, as 
against fellow employees who happened to 
push dock dollies or ride cranes to their 
injury or death 
Id (emphasis added) 
[2J We find a number of problems with 
this reasoning and holding First, the word 
"personally" in the holding implies that al-
though an employer need not personally pay 
PIP benefits, perhaps the employer's private 
no-fault insurer would have to do so See 2A 
Arthur Larson. The Law oj Workmen's Com-
pensation % 7124(e), at 14-69 n 4 (1994) 
(citing IML Freight and speculating that its 
holding may apply only to self-insurer) 
Whether an employee is entitled to PIP ben-
efits cannot turn on the employer's decision 
to secure private insurance oi to self-insure 
See § 41-12a-407(2) (self-insurers "shall pay 
benefits to persons injured from the self-
funded person's operation, maintenance, and 
use of motoi vehicles as vvould an insurer 
issuing a policy to the self-funded person"), 
Neel v State 854 P 2d 581. 584 (Utah Ct 
App 1993) ("The State's election to self-in 
suie cannot become a stumbling block to the 
swift lecovery of PIP benefits") AJthough 
parts of IML Ft eight can be iead to clarify 
the court's use of the word "personally," the 
holding remains confusing 
The court's discnmination-of-workeis theo-
ry is also troubling It ignores the legisla-
ture's requirement that no-fault coverage ap-
ply to 4,[e)very policy of (autol insurance." 
§ 31A-22-302(2) Thus, contrary to IML 
Freight the no-fault statute effectively im-
posed upon all owners of motor vehicles-
including employers—an additional burden to 
buy PIP coverage for their vehicles 
The legislature chose to regulate this as-
pect of insurance for all owners of motor 
vehicles, including employers who own the 
motor vehicles used in their businesses 
This can hardly be deemed discrimination 
"[0)ur legislature has the power and duty to 
promote the public health, safety, and gener-
al welfare of all citizens. In furtherance of 
that power and duty, conditions and regula-
tions for the operation of motoi vehicles on 
our public roads and highways are a proper 
subject for legislative action " State v Ste-
vens, 718 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1986) (per 
cunam) (footnote omitted) Indeed, the only 
discrimination that is involved here arises 
from IML Freight One who is injured in a 
motor vehicle accident and is covered by 
workers' compensation is entitled to less ben-
efits than anothei who is also injured in such 
an accident but is not covered by workers' 
compensation 
B Utah Code Ann $ .llA-22-J09(3) 
The most troubling aspect of IML Freight 
is its cursory tieatment of the statute that 
directly confronts this issue The no-fault 
statute explicitly provides, "The benefits pay-
able to any injured person undei (the PIP 
statute| are reduced by (a) any benefits 
which that person receives or is entitled to 
receive as a result of an accident covered in 
this code under anv workers' compensation 
or similar statutory plan " § 31A-22-
309(3) At the time IML Freight was decid-
ed, the substantially identical statute was 
numbered at section 31-41-7(3) (Supp 1973) 
IML Ft eight mentions the statute only in 
passing 
If there be an argument that the No-
Fault Act supersedes the Woikmen s Com-
pensation Act because it allows foi deduc-
tion of Workmen's Compensation pay-
ments from a No-Fault msuiance judg 
ment or settlement, constitutionally it 
NEEL v 
Cite as 889 P 2d 
would appear to be flattened, since the 
added compensation thus afforded obvious-
ly would discriminate in favor of one type 
of employee, at the expense of an employ-
er, and to the exclusion of others 
IML Fi eight, 538 P 2d at 297 We disagree 
with this analysis 
"The couit's pnncipal duty in inteipreting 
statutes is to determine legislative intent, 
and the best evidence of legislative intent is 
the plain language of the statute " Sullivan 
v Scoulai Grain Co of Utah, 853 P 2d 877, 
879 (Utah 1993) (citing Jensen v Intermoun 
tain Health Caie, Inc, 679 P 2d 903, 906 
(Utah 1984)) "[W]e presume that the Legis-
lature used each term advisedly, and we give 
effect to each term accoiding to its ordinary 
and accepted meaning " Versluis v Guaran 
ty Nat'l Cos, 842 P2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992) 
[3] The plain language of section 31A-
22-309(3)(a) indicates that the legislature 
considered the very issue that is at hand in 
this case and decided that PIP benefits are 
payable to an injured employee but that 
these benefits are i educed by "any benefits 
which that person receives under 
workers compensation ' In other words, an 
injured part} should be able to receive PIP 
benefits to the extent that those benefits are 
not alread\ paid b\ workers' compensation 
The court of ap|>eals has alieady so inter 
preted the statute 
We interpiet [section 31 A-22-309(3)(a) ] as 
expressing the legislature's determination 
that, as between a no fault insurer and a 
workers compensation insurer , the no 
fault insurer should not bear the burden of 
paying the benefits due to an employee 
accidentl\ injured m the course of employ 
ment even if that injury occurred in a 
vehicle coveied b\ the requisite no-fault 
insurance Accoidingly, the no fault in 
surer i* permitted by this statute to ex 
elude fiom coverage provided under its 
insurance policy an if liability for injuries 
that cue compensable undet the workeis 
compensation statute 
Bevans i Industrial Commit, 790 P 2d 573, 
577 (Utah CtAppl990) (emphasis added) 
Thus wheie an accident is covered b> both 
workers compensation and no fault insur 
ance, the statute per mits a no fault insurer to 
. STATE Utah 925 
922 (Utah 1995) 
exclude some liability—that which is compen-
sable under workers' compensation—but not 
all liability 
In oral argument, the State contended that 
the PIP statute was intended to benefit only 
employees dnving then own vehicles not 
employees driving then employers' vehicles 
This strained interpretation would have us 
read language into an otherwise unambigu 
ous statute The State cites no authoi lty for 
this assertion, and our own leseaich has not 
uncovered any case suppoiting this theory 
Although there is some split of authority 
on whether the exclusive remedy clause bars 
an action by employees against their employ 
ers' no-fault insurance, the division is primar-
ily due to the differing language of the van 
ous no-fault statutes See 2A Arthur Larson, 
The Law of Workmen s Compensation 
§ 7124(e), at 14-68 (1994), Vitauts M Gul 
bis, Annotation, Validity and Construction of 
No-Fault Insurance Plans Piomding for 
Reduction of Benefits Otherwise Payable by 
Amounts Receivable From Independent Col-
lateral Sources, 10 A L R 4th 996, 1010-13 
(1981) 
No split of authority appears, howevei in 
states whose no-fault statutes specifically 
provide that PIP benefits will be reduced by 
woi kers' compensation benefits as does sec 
tion 31A-22-309(3)(a) These states have 
uniformly allowed both types of benefits 
Sec c g Tate v Industrial Claim Appeals 
Office, 815 P2d 15, 19 (Colo 1991) (This 
provision coordinates the workers compensa 
tion and PIP benefits so that the injured 
person does not receive duplicate benefits'), 
Brown v Boston Old Colony Ins Co 247 
Ga 287, 275 S E 2d 651, 652 (1981) (declining 
to go against clear statutoi} language to 
deny PIP benefits to mjuied employee) All 
state Ins Co v Sentry Ins Co of Michigan, 
175 MichApp 157, 437 N V\ 2d 33b 339 
(1989) (statutes purpose 'is to reduce the 
basic cost of insurance by requiring a set off 
of those government benefits [including 
workers compensation] that duplicate no 
fault benefits and coordinating those benefits 
a victim ma\ receive') Carrier In^ Co i 
Bwakowsku 93 Misc 2d 100 402 N \ S 2d 
333, 334 (1978) (declining to go against clear 
statutory language to deny PIP benefit^ to 
injured employee) 
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This interpretation is consistent with that 
of a respected insurance law treatise: 
A provision of the no-fault law permitting 
an offset of benefits received under work-
er's compensation laws rather than the 
total disqualification of employed persons, 
is the customary approach. Thus, while 
the PIP insurer has no absolute defense, it 
mat/ receive a credit for the compensation 
fKu/ments which have been received. 
HD John A. Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice $ 51K7. at 574-75 (1981) (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added).1 
14 j Had the legislature intended PIP in-
surers to have an absolute defense against 
injured employees, lawmakers could have 
easily added language to the statute indicat-
ing this intent. Interestingly, in wording the 
uninsured and undennsured motorist cover-
age statute, the legislature did that very 
thing by adding this language: "This cover-
age does not apply to an employee, who is 
injured by an uninsured motorist, whose ex-
clusive remedy is provided by Title 35. Chap-
ter 1. Workers' Compensation " $ 31A-22-
305(4)(b)(n). No similar language is included 
in the PIP statutes, and we have " 'no power 
to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an 
intention not expressed.'" hi rr Crnnmal 
htrcstiuatxm. 754 V :l<\ G33. <>4(i (Utah 1988) 
(quoting Mountain Stales 7W ,v Tel Co c. 
Public Srrr Cnnnn'n. 107 I ' t ah 502. 505, 155 
P.2d 1H4. KS5 ( U t a h 1945)) 
I I I C n N C L C S l M N 
(5, (i| This case is simplx an action by an 
employee. Neel. against her employer's no-
fault insurer The State's designated insurer 
here is the State itself. The workers" com-
pensation exclusivity provision does not bar 
this action No-fault insurers, including self-
insurers, are required to pa> PIP benefits to 
injured employees to the extent those bene-
fits exceed workers' compensation benefits 
I. Manx UIM'>> L'Uctl h\ m e pas He- -<••. not pet s u a 
MU' b ^ a u > e t b o ^ e ! J K H P I : . a p p a . e n l k J o 
not h a w r a m i e s -,;;; i f .i: h - . ' :> >\ i * IA--22-
*<>SM<) i f u l e x p l a i n h->-. ;IIL k -j . . - . . , , , . i n t e n d e d 
m s u i e i s lo v. i mi d i n a l e no- la i : 1 ' ,uid w u r k e t s 
c o m p e n s a t e .»n bcueti1 . - V • - _ (.n/U'H \ 
H'uiy-u >(»~ Aik >< ; S j n N \\ _\j 4'^T 4S.u 
{ I W | M V M I I k f l ^  ^ ' l l i p i - l l N . l l l M n -. v J l I M V | |V J a t l N C 
b a i l e d J a i m l o i u m n M u c d m - - i . » M ^ b e n c h l s ) 
( V W i / v ( < • •. (... '<-;:.•.• J J M . • ! . : • • > ^ 6 1 0 A 2 d 
i : - 7 | > o i |Ou_>, . ^ , i l K - , .\y,,..,.: h \1 his Cu 
In so holding, we overrule IML Freight 
insofar as it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
We are keenly aware of the doctrine of stare 
decisis and its importance as " 'a cornerstone 
of the Anglo-American jurisprudence that is 
crucial to the predictability of the law and 
the fairness of adjudication.' " State v. Men 
zres, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (1994) (quoting State 
v. Thnrman, 84G P.2d 125G, 12G9 (Utah 
1993)). However, in the case of IML 
Freight, we are " 'clearly convinced that the 
rule was originally erroneous and that 
more good than harm will come by departing 
from [its] precedent.' " Menzies, 889 P.2d at 
399 (quoting John Hanna, The Role of Prece-
dent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill.L.Rev. 367, 
3G7 (1957)). 
[7) Although the State's self-insurance 
program excludes PIP benefits to any person 
entitled to workers' compensation benefits, 
this exclusion is not in harmony with statuto-
ry requirements and is therefore invalid. 
Fanners Ins. Exch. v. CalL 712 P.2d 231, 233 
(Utah 1985) ("An insurer has the right to 
contract with an insured as to the risks it will 
or will not assume, as long as neither statuto-
ry law nor public policy is violated."); see 
also Ferro v. Utah Deji't of Commerce. 828 
P.2d 507. 512 n 7 (Utah Ct.App.1992) ("If an 
agency regulation is not in harmony with [a] 
statute, it is invalid."). 
We reverse the district court's grant of 
summary judgment and remand to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
ZIMMERMAN. C.J.. STEWART. 
Associate C.J.. and DURHAM and 
RUSSON. .)<}.. concur 
• (.ulnae V//i/ ( usually Co O-ll S W 2d 49 51 
(K\ I t A p p 1^82) ( e m p l o y e r s m s i n c i l iable for 
b o t h w o r k e r s t o m p c n s a i ion «uul basn. i cpara -
t iun b e n e f i t s ) . / / e m e . M r L<n laic («<v> t o . 755 
S W 2d U l . U l ( M o C i A p p ls»88) I sell insured 
e m p l o v e i r e q u n c d lo p r o v i d e b o t h u n i n s u r e d 
rnoioi ist c o v e r a g e a n d u o r k c i s c o m p e n s a t i o n lo 
e m p l o y e e ) fc>>s ,• Liberty \l„t l,,s C o . 392 
Pa S u p e . ^71 S73 A 2d 6 1 0 612 i m i ) ) iumn-
vii ied i n o t o i i s i b e n e f i t s i n d e p e n d e n t ol w o r k e r s ' 
c o m p e n s a t i o n ) 
